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63 
ANTHONY KENNEDY’S BLIND QUEST 
Scot Powe* 
Steve Bickerstaff** † 
League of United Latin American Citizens [LULAC] v. Perry embraced, 
in the context of partisan gerrymandering, Felix Frankfurter’s conclusion 
that the Supreme Court should not enter the political thicket of legislative 
apportionment. Two years earlier in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court split 4–1–4 
on the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering. O’Conner and the three 
conservatives held it was nonjusticiable. Each of the four moderate liberals 
offered a test showing it was justiciable. Kennedy dissented from the con-
servatives while simultaneously rejecting each of the four tests offered. He 
announced he was waiting for a better test. When far superior tests were 
offered in LULAC, he rejected them too.  
The newly rejected tests were simplicity personified. Both hinged on the 
fact of mid-decade redistricting. One claimed that when a state engages in 
voluntary unnecessary redistricting, it bears the burden of justification. The 
other avoided justiciability altogether by reverting to the early “one person, 
one vote” cases. It claimed that a state was bound by Karcher v. Daggett to 
make a good faith effort to create districts as equal as possible. Because the 
Texas redistricting was mid-decade, the census data was outdated and there-
fore the Texas legislature could not know if its plan was equal, better, or 
worse than the one it replaced. Indifference could not constitute good faith. 
LULAC not only offered a clear standard, it offered clean facts. A di-
vided Texas legislature failed to adopt a new redistricting plan in 2001 so a 
federal court did. Then, with Republicans controlling both houses and the 
governor, the legislature replaced the court-ordered plan with one of its own 
in 2003 (on the third try after Democrats thwarted the first two by fleeing to 
Oklahoma and New Mexico respectively. Who says there is no learning 
curve for Democrats?). No one disputed that the goal of the mid-decade re-
districting in Texas was to defeat all ten incumbent Anglo Democratic 
Congressmen and to add seven Republicans to the Texas delegation, which 
after the 2002 elections had a 17–15 Democratic edge even though no De-
mocratic candidate had been elected statewide since 1996. (Additionally the 
plan shored up the district (District 23) of Hispanic Republican incumbent 
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Henry Bonilla by removing 100,000 Hispanics (a group that overwhelm-
ingly preferred his opponents in recent elections) and replacing them 
primarily with Anglos. Kennedy, for the majority, held this move to violate 
the Voting Rights Act. Kennedy, for a different majority, held that the de-
struction of Marvin Frost’s Dallas district, where he had enjoyed huge 
African American support, did not violate the Voting Rights Act.)  
The 2003 plan, demanded by then Republican majority leader Tom De-
Lay, was a masterpiece that worked. Only three of the ten incumbent Anglo 
Democrats won reelection as Democrats—surprisingly one in a heavily Re-
publican district—and the Texas delegation shifted to a 21-11 Republican 
majority. The results gave Republicans an added margin in their narrow ma-
jority in Congress. Furthermore, it is all but inconceivable that any 
Republican incumbent, except Bonilla, could lose in the new districts during 
the remaining three election cycles before the constitutionally mandated 
redistricting takes place. It will be necessary to change between four and six 
district lines to comply with the holding that District 23 violates the Voting 
Rights Act, but only Bonilla is at risk in this process. 
Kennedy rejected the mid-decade trigger because it could not reach all 
partisan gerrymandering and because it could encourage partisan gerryman-
dering at the beginning of the decade. The best face that could be placed on 
the Republicans’ plan was that it was tit-for-tat. Kennedy accepted the claim 
that a Democratically controlled Texas legislature in 1991 adopted a gerry-
mander that allowed Democrats to keep control of the Texas congressional 
delegation even as the party was losing control of state elections for the first 
time since Reconstruction. Democrats, Kennedy reasoned, had gerryman-
dered to keep a minority party in power; Republicans had gerrymandered in 
2003 to give a majority party (a bit more than) its due. The mid-decade test 
would only allow the latter redistricting to be held unconstitutional. This 
Kennedy thought was peculiar. 
Because the test would have left the 1991 gerrymander alive but invali-
dated the 2003 one, Kennedy asserted it “does not have the reliability 
appellants ascribe to it.” Kennedy makes perfection the enemy of the “pretty 
good.” Even though partisan gerrymandering is a bad thing, there is proba-
bly no way to stop it because, as the four conservatives claim, all districting 
is gerrymandering and there is no baseline to tell when a party has gone 
from constitutional padding to an unconstitutional grab. The fact that that 
problem of gerrymandering cannot be entirely solved does not mean that the 
problem of voluntary redistricting without state (as opposed to partisan) 
justification cannot be solved. Placing the burden on the state will sniff out 
mid-decade partisan gerrymandering. It is perfectly reliable for that issue. In 
conflating voluntary redistricting with mandatory redistricting, Kennedy has 
functionally adopted the conservatives’ position.  
Kennedy also believes that if mid-decade partisan gerrymandering is 
blocked, then one effect “could be to encourage partisan excess at the outset 
of the decade, when a legislature redistricts pursuant to its decennial consti-
tutional duty.” In other words, if they are prohibited from cheating later, then 
they will cheat sooner. But when one party controls both the legislature and 
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the governor, it needs no encouragement to gerrymander itself more seats. 
Computers have allowed politicians to perfect gerrymandering for two dec-
ades now. Telling legislators it is now or never is hardly news. After all, until 
Texas engaged in mid-decade state-wide redistricting, no state in the modern 
era had done so (either because no one had thought of it, or because initial 
gerrymanders had proven effective, or because the legislators understood 
that they had no reliable population enumerations for assuring equal popula-
tion among the districts). 
Arguing in the court below, one of us asserted that the state’s theory 
would allow for a partisan gerrymander in 2009 in preparation for the de-
cennial redistricting in 2011. One of the judges then asked the Texas 
Solicitor General if that was correct. His answer was yes (but of course no 
one would do that). There is a difference between a partisan gerrymander at 
the beginning of the decade and one later on. The later one waits, the easier 
it is to account for population movement and therefore the ultimate success 
of the gerrymander. If holding mid-decade redistricting would in fact in-
crease the likelihood of partisan gerrymandering at the beginning (and for 
reasons just stated we find this unpersuasive), then at least it forces a less 
reliable gerrymander. 
By refusing to close the door on mid-decade redistricting, the Court 
opened it. Texas was first, but in 2006 Georgia followed suit. A year earlier, 
California’s Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger offered a ballot initiative that 
would have redistricted that state, but the voters rejected it. Other states have 
indicated interest. Thus LULAC opens the door to rolling redistricting and 
not only on the Congressional level. Any body, from the state legislature to a 
school board, could take advantage of LULAC (except as limited by state 
law). Politicians will walk through that opening and this will exacerbate the 
corrosive cynicism that Americans have acquired believing that politics is 
rigged by and for the politicians. 
Early in his opinion Kennedy saluted the replacing of the court-ordered 
2001 plan with one drawn by politicians. “[T]he obligation placed upon the 
Federal Judiciary is unwelcome because drawing lines for congressional 
districts is one of the most significant acts a State can perform to ensure 
citizen participation in republican self-governance.” Oh? There was no 
clamor in Texas for new congressional districts in 2003. The demand was 
from Washington, DC (by a Congressman who, when he would resign in 
2006 announced that his home was in Virginia not Texas). Nor is there any 
basis for believing that the 2003 plan ensures citizen participation. Indeed, 
quite to the contrary, it was designed to thwart citizen participation. New 
Republican districts in North Texas stretch like pancakes from the Dallas 
suburbs eastward. Because party activists are more likely to vote in primary 
elections, these allow the suburbs to control the choices for the more moder-
ate Republicans and Independents in East Texas. And since the districts 
were drawn so that no Democrat could have a chance of prevailing no mat-
ter whom Republicans nominated, the only election that matters is the 
Republican primary. If Kennedy believes what he writes, then he is living in 
his youth when we were taught that voters choose their representatives. The 
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computer has put an end to that. Representatives choose their voters. This 
was done with care to ensure no fewer than 20 Republicans in the Texas 
delegation. 
For those who believe good lawyering matters (and we do), LULAC is a 
gem. The Texas Solicitor General, Ted Cruz, out-lawyered the plaintiffs in 
the district court and by all accounts out-argued them before the Supreme 
Court. One result was that the Court never understood that the 1991 gerry-
mander occurred largely in Dallas and Houston with districts that were not 
at issue in 2003 when Republicans primarily targeted rural Democrats 
elected by ticket-splitting Republicans or Independents in reasonably com-
pact districts outside these urban areas. Another was that Kennedy actually 
questioned whether the plan was truly partisan gerrymandering since “parti-
san aims did not guide every line” and “a number of line-drawing requests 
by Democratic state legislators were honored.” Does he have any conception 
of how big (and diverse) Texas is? Of course not “every line” was partisan, 
but that hardly made an ugly gerrymander pretty and the Voting Rights Act 
(even if violated) was still a constraint (even if the professionals at the Jus-
tice Department were overruled by their political bosses). 
At least five justices correctly intuited that there was something terribly 
wrong with what happened in Texas in 2003, but the Court missed its oppor-
tunity to preempt the ill-conceived (and anti-democratic) practice of rolling 
redistricting. The credit goes to Cruz, the blame to Kennedy who, like Jus-
tice Sandra Day O’Connor before him, relishes the power of the being the 
swing vote. O’Connor was the architect of many of the principles that have 
determined election law for the past quarter-century. Alone among members 
of the Court, she could draw on real life experience as an elected legislator. 
To be sure, some of her opinions, like Shaw v. Reno, appear inscrutable, 
while Kennedy’s opinion, by contrast, is understandable even as it has an air 
of unreality about it. He has wound up where the conservatives are, but he 
either doesn’t know it or doesn’t want to admit it. Furthermore his newly 
found penchant for “compact” minority districts adds nothing to election law 
jurisprudence (unlike Scalia’s with his conclusion that districts can be drawn 
using race as a predominant consideration when necessary to comply with the 
Voting Rights Act because compliance is a compelling state interest). 
If, as we fear, state and local governments follow the precedent of Texas 
and engage in unnecessary, wasteful, and acrimonious redistricting using 
inaccurate population data to benefit partisan interests, we would like to 
believe the justices will regret their decision in LULAC v. Perry. But we 
doubt that will happen because there was also an air of unreality about the 
challenge to the 2003 gerrymander. This is, after all, the Court (and a jus-
tice) that assisted George W. Bush into the White House. Could anyone 
believe it was realistic to expect it (or him) to unseat six Republican Con-
gressmen to assist Nancy Pelosi into the Speaker’s Chair? 
